

**Title:** A Cost-Benefit Model for Pretrial Justice

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**Abstract:**

*Research Summary*

Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) in criminal justice examines the investment in system practices and monetizes the outcomes of those practices, allowing for analysis of return on investment. This paper discusses a cost-benefit model for pretrial. The model considers the actuarial risk of defendants, the intervention options available to the court, and the outcomes of failure to appear in court and pretrial misconduct. Jurisdictions populate the model with data on marginal costs of crime, incarceration, and victimization, as well as lengths of stay in jail, rates of pretrial failure, and a risk profile of the pretrial population.

*Policy Implications*

The pretrial cost-benefit model produces a baseline analysis of current practice, as well as modeling the impact of future policy changes. This allows policymakers a more nuanced understanding of the impact of pretrial decision making from a public safety and fiscal perspective. While cost-benefit information alone is not sufficient to inform pretrial policies, the model provides guidance on when release, supervision, and incarceration each offer the most benefit to the community, based on the risk posed by individual defendants.

**Text:**

*The Costs Associated with Pretrial Justice*

The pretrial stage of the justice system represents the “front door” for most court involved individuals, and pretrial decisions have significant implications for those individuals, their families, and the community. Pretrial spans the point of arrest through disposition of a case, and includes diversion, jail, pretrial release, and court processing. Decision makers include police, prosecutors, judges and magistrates, jail administrators, and pretrial services professionals, all of whom aim to strike a balance between due process for the defendant, public safety, and efficient court operation.

The costs of the pretrial system are significant; former Attorney General Eric Holder cited the cost of pretrial incarceration alone at \$9 Billion per year (Holder, 2011). Many of these costs are straightforward. Taxpayers bear the burden of expenses to arrest, prosecute, and in some cases to supervise or incarcerate individuals who have been accused of a crime. Victims often incur direct expenses as a result of crime, which may or may not be reimbursed through restitution. Other costs of pretrial are less straightforward, and potentially extend far beyond the pretrial period. Incarcerated defendants are at risk of losing their jobs or housing, putting their ability to contribute to society and care for families at risk. These costs may impact taxpayers in the future, through human services needs or potentially future crime.

A defendant’s behavior during the pretrial period also has associated costs. The two primary outcomes of interest during the pretrial phase are court appearance rates and pretrial misconduct. Failures to appear require, at minimum, that the hearing be rescheduled at the court’s expense, as well as the potential cost of re-arrest and incarceration. Pretrial misconduct includes violations of terms of release, which can lead to incarceration, and new law violations, which have all of the costs associated with a crime. While the responsibility for violating terms of release ultimately lies with the defendant, the decisions made by system actors have the potential to minimize the risks posed by the released population and increase the efficiency of the pretrial system.

### *Minimizing Pretrial Costs: What the Research Says*

The fundamental decision of the pretrial stage is whether to release a defendant to the community or hold the defendant in jail. At its most simplistic, this is a tradeoff between the cost of jail incarceration, the cost of monitoring a defendant in the community, and a no-cost release on one's own recognizance. From this perspective, release on recognizance or community supervision are consistently the cheaper alternatives to jail. However, the situation becomes more complex when considering the cost implications of the defendant's behavior in the community. If a defendant is released and subsequently commits a new crime, the cost to victims and the community may exceed the cost of incarceration. Alternately, if an individual is incarcerated unnecessarily, the cost to the taxpayers, the defendant, and his family may exceed the averted cost of new crime. The crux of the matter lies in determining who is most likely to commit a new crime or fail to appear, and therefore warrants the investment in incarceration, and who is most likely to be successful prior to disposition and warrants release.

Significant research is available on factors that influence pretrial misconduct and failure to appear, and this research can be applied both to individual pretrial decision making and calculations of pretrial costs. Common risk factors include criminal history, history of failure to appear, and contextual factors such as employment or substance use. The use of a validated actuarial risk assessment tool can guide decision making at arrest, booking, first appearance, and any subsequent review of bail to determine who is at higher risk of failure to appear and pretrial misconduct. Generally, low risk individuals are good candidates for release on one's own recognizance, moderate risk individuals are candidates for pretrial supervision, and high risk individuals should be detained as allowed by law (Lowenkamp and VanNostrand, 2013).

From a cost perspective, the use of risk information is very useful in comparing the fiscal implications of pretrial release versus incarceration. As risk level increases, so does the likelihood of

crime and failure to appear, and therefore the potential cost. When this is compared with the cost of incarceration, policymakers can make a more accurate assessment of where the benefits of incarceration might outweigh the costs. Figure 1, below, demonstrates this relationship graphically.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

This example uses hypothetical data to illustrate how the costs of crime can be compared to the cost of detention. In this example, it is more costly to release the highest risk defendants because of the estimated harm they will cause from new criminal offenses. For the lowest risk defendants the costs of detention far outweigh the estimated costs of new criminal offenses. The shape of the risk distribution and the point of intersection will vary by jurisdiction depending on risk levels, the costs of crime and detention, and the length of time spent on case dispositions and in jail. Of course, in real life this is not a purely mathematical calculation, and the circumstances of individual defendants, victims, and crimes are taken into consideration. On the whole, though, when jurisdictions base decisions on risk they can make more informed choices on where and how to invest pretrial resources.

In addition to the outcome of pretrial decisions, the length of time a defendant spends incarcerated pretrial is important as well. Recent research funded by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation provides additional insight into the fiscal impact of pretrial decision making. When researchers examined post-dispositional reoffending amongst pretrial defendants, they found that detaining low risk defendants for more than 24 hours is associated with a higher likelihood of committing a new crime up to 24 months post-disposition (Lowenkamp, VanNostrand, and Holsinger, 2013a). In addition, defendants who are detained pretrial are more likely to be incarcerated post-disposition, and more likely to receive a longer sentence than similarly situated defendants who were released pretrial (Lowenkamp, VanNostrand, and Holsinger, 2013b). This means that extra detention

days do not only increase jail costs, but can also potentially impact future costs for prisons, police, courts, and victims. Though these conclusions are derived from only one study, it is the largest pretrial study of its kind and warrants consideration.

Paradoxically, a great deal of pretrial decision making is currently based on money through the use of cash and surety bond, but these decisions generally do not align with the research on maximizing pretrial success (Pretrial Justice Institute, 2012). Most jurisdictions use a charge-based “bond schedule” to assign a bond amount without consideration of individual risk. Defendants can then pay a deposit to the court or pay a fee to a commercial bail bondsman to secure their release. Under most circumstances, the court returns the deposit if the defendant returns to court, but bondsmen do not return any fees collected. This system is often presented as free of cost to taxpayers, and therefore a good value. However, this system does not account for the defendant’s actuarial risk, and therefore could contribute to the costs of pretrial failure.

In addition, individuals who are technically eligible for release on financial bond may not have the resources to pay, resulting in unnecessary jail bed use. The Pretrial Justice Institute’s recent study of defendants in Colorado found that those released on unsecured bond (e.g. no money needed to be paid prior to release) had the same outcomes pretrial as those released on a secured financial bond. However, of those eligible for release on unsecured bond, 80% had been released within 24 hours. The group eligible for release on secured bond required up to six days to reach an 80% release rate, and ten days before the two groups reached parity (Jones, 2013). The difference in length of stay is due to the time needed to meet financial terms, and in the interim, taxpayers are funding the cost of incarceration.

#### *A Cost-Benefit Approach to Pretrial Justice*

Pretrial justice is generally the purview of county government, within the confines of state and federal law and court rule. The county officials who oversee pretrial, including police chiefs, sheriffs and

jail administrators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, are often a loosely knit collaborative with autonomy over their own decision points. Given the complexity of this system and the numerous cost implications of pretrial, it is difficult to incorporate cost information in a meaningful systematic way. The remainder of this paper describes the use of a cost-benefit approach to inform policymaking in pretrial justice.

### *Cost-benefit Analysis in Criminal Justice*

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) refers to a specific methodology for analyzing the value of interventions designed to achieve a specific outcome. As defined by the Cost-benefit Knowledge Bank for Criminal Justice (Vera Institute of Justice, 2014):

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a method for comparing the economic pros and cons of policies and programs to help policymakers identify the best or most valuable options to pursue. A characteristic feature of CBA is that it monetizes, or puts into dollar terms, all the benefits and all the costs associated with an initiative so that they can be directly compared....[W]hen evaluating a criminal justice program using CBA, the costs and benefits to victims, offenders, program participants, family members, and communities need to be factored in.

The use of criminal justice cost-benefit models have grown in recent years. The Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) was the first organization to develop a comprehensive cost-benefit model for the criminal justice system. WSIPP provides cost-benefit information to the state legislature in order to inform policy decisions. Despite the narrow goals of its research, WSIPP's rigorous methodology has given national credibility to its findings. Its approach includes a comprehensive review of evaluation data to identify evidence-based or promising practices, followed by a cost-benefit analysis of effective programs.<sup>1</sup> The Results First Initiative, a joint venture of the Pew Charitable Trusts and the

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<sup>1</sup> For more information visit the Washington State Institute for Public Policy website: <http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/>

John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (n.d.), has taken WSIPP's work and brought it to over 20 jurisdictions around the country. Results First informs state and local policymaking with the following approach:

- Systematically identify which programs work and which do not;
- Calculate potential returns on investment of funding alternative programs;
- Rank programs based on their projected benefits, costs, and investment risks;
- Identify ineffective programs that could be targeted for cuts or elimination; and
- Predict the impact of different policy options

Both the WSIPP and Results First models are grounded in data for discrete jurisdictions, but collectively have generated a broad body of knowledge on effective interventions and their return on investment. The Bureau of Justice Assistance has also invested in this data collection through the Cost-benefit Knowledge Bank for Criminal Justice (Vera Institute of Justice, 2014). The pretrial cost-benefit model developed by the author and discussed in this paper uses a similar methodology as WSIPP and Results First to monetize the costs of crime.

Despite the growth of CBA, little cost-benefit information is available on pretrial decision making. The Laura and John Arnold Foundation published an issue brief on the hidden costs of pretrial justice (Lowenkamp, VanNostrand, and Holsinger, 2013b), but it does not include a formal attempt to monetize pretrial interventions and outcomes. Some cost-benefit publications, such as the Vera Institute of Justice (2014) cost-benefit toolkit, reference pretrial in fundamental calculations on averted jail bed days, but they do not address the pretrial system comprehensively. In *Pre-trial detention: A cost-benefit approach*, Bowles and Cohen (2008) describe a potential strategy for pretrial cost-benefit analysis, including the fundamental tradeoffs of a pretrial CBA model: "Gain from release (freedom) + Jail savings - Harm caused while released - Cost of re-apprehension". However, the model only

considers the dichotomy of detention or release, without consideration for the risk level of the defendant or the variable of pretrial supervision.

In 2013, the Public Welfare Foundation funded the development of a cost-benefit model for pretrial. The author led the development of the model, incorporating the WSIPP methodology that had been applied successfully to other criminal justice decision points. In collaboration with the Crime and Justice Institute (2014), the model was tailored to pretrial and tested in two jurisdictions: Boulder County, Colorado and Johnson County, Kansas. The model was informed by advisors from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Pretrial Justice Institute, the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, and the Pretrial Services Agency of the District of Columbia. The goal of the model was twofold: to monetize the pretrial outcomes of failure to appear and pretrial misconduct and demonstrate the impact of “business as usual” pretrial practice; and to allow jurisdictions to model the potential impact of future policy decision making.

#### *Pretrial Cost-Benefit Analysis Methodology*

Most cost-analyses of pretrial compare the costs of jail beds relative to the costs of pretrial supervision. This is certainly part of the equation, but it is also important to estimate the costs to taxpayers and crime victims from pretrial misconduct and failures to appear while the defendant otherwise could have been in jail. This cost-benefit model is designed to estimate the tradeoff between jail beds and public safety, as well as incorporate the most recent research on the impacts of pretrial detention on sentencing, short-term rates of new criminal activity and failure to appear, and long term recidivism.

In order to use this model, jurisdictions need to gather data on their pretrial system as well as general cost and system use data for the criminal justice system as a whole. The pretrial data is used to estimate the baseline number of jail beds used for the pretrial population as well as the estimated



number of crimes and failures to appear for released defendants. The criminal justice system cost information is used to estimate the costs of failures to appear as well as new criminal offenses. The model then estimates the change in costs from different release decisions, incorporating both taxpayer costs from system usage differences as well as victimization costs from changes in the number of new criminal offenses.

*Pretrial Calculations.* This pretrial model is designed to allow jurisdictions to enter their own pretrial data, broken out by up to five risk levels. In order to use all of its features, the model does require that risk information is available on the pretrial population. Jurisdictions that are not currently using a risk assessment can use a static risk assessment on a sample of cases to approximate the risk profile in the jurisdiction. The model does not include any data on money bond because of the lack of relationship between bond amounts and pretrial outcomes.

Using jail booking data, the length of time from booking to release can be calculated by risk level. This data is used to calculate the number of jail beds that are being used by each risk level. To simplify the model, the length of time-to-release is placed into three categories: quick (0-1 day); average (2-7 days); and slow (more than 7 days). The range of days in the time-to-release categories can be adjusted based on the needs of each jurisdiction. These three time-to-release categories are compared to the length of time spent in jail during the pretrial period for those not released in order to estimate the avoided jail bed days as well as the time at risk in the community.

Using the same risk categories as described above and data on pretrial failures, the public safety outcomes of released defendants can be estimated by risk level. The likelihood of failure to appear and new criminal offense by risk level can be divided by the number of days in the community between release and disposition to estimate the daily likelihood of failure to appear and new criminal activity. For example, if a moderate risk defendant has a 10 percent chance of failure to appear and is at risk in

the community for 50 days, the daily likelihood of failure to appear is 10 percent divided by 50 days or 0.2 percent. This calculation assumes a linear distribution for the timing of failure to appear and new criminal offense. This assumption can be adjusted in future iterations of the model if new research suggests a different distribution. These estimates are then used to predict the number of new criminal offenses and failures to appear by risk level of various release decisions. For example, if a jurisdiction decides to release fewer high risk defendants from jail the number of additional jail beds needed can be compared to reduced crime and failure to appear from those defendants remaining in jail.

This pretrial cost-benefit model also incorporates the latest pretrial research from Lowenkamp, VanNostrand, and Holsinger (2013b), mentioned above, and includes the impact on the likelihood of new criminal offense and failures to appear when the time spent in jail is greater than one day. As this research continues to develop, the impact and the timing of the impact can be easily adjusted for each of the five risk categories included in the model. The model also is capable of incorporating the impact of long term recidivism reductions and reduced jail and prison sentences associated with pretrial release.

The data and calculations described above are all used to compare a jurisdiction's pretrial outcomes under various assumptions and policy choices. For example, a jurisdiction can estimate the impact of releasing low risk pretrial defendants in 0.5 days instead of two days and estimate the jail bed days saved, the change in failures to appear and new criminal offenses, and the change on long term recidivism and sentencing. While these outcomes are important to policy makers, it is difficult to compare an avoided jail bed to an additional failure to appear or new criminal offense. In order to compare these outcomes it is necessary to use the common metric of cost. The section below describes the method used to monetize the outcomes of most interest: jail beds and public safety.

*Criminal Justice Cost Calculations.* For a pretrial cost-benefit analysis one of the most important calculations is the cost of a jail bed. Studies that examine the savings from avoided jail beds often mistakenly use the average cost of a jail bed to calculate the overall savings from a policy. The average cost is much easier to obtain but will overstate the true savings or avoided costs of policy change.<sup>2</sup> For this reason it is important to estimate the marginal or incremental cost savings from small changes in the overall jail population. This can be done by looking at detailed budget data and excluding costs that are fixed over small changes in the population like capital costs, utilities, managerial staff, and other fixed costs. The marginal cost estimate will be used to monetize the impact of jail bed changes from pretrial policy or practice changes. The change in jail bed costs will be compared to pretrial supervision costs to estimate the overall change in direct system costs.

One of the ways this cost-benefit model adds to the pretrial research is by estimating the impact of pretrial decisions on crime and then monetizing the changes in crime. When crime occurs there are direct costs to taxpayers through police involvement, court and attorney involvement, community supervision and incarceration. There are also both tangible and intangible costs to crime victims.<sup>3</sup> Depending on the type of crime and jurisdiction where the crime took place, costs and the amounts of resources used will vary greatly. Because of the large variations in costs and system response to crime it is important for each jurisdiction to estimate their specific system costs and use.

To estimate the cost of a new criminal offense it is necessary to gather data on the marginal cost to police for an arrest; the marginal costs to the Public Defender, the District Attorney and the courts to

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<sup>2</sup> For a full description of the importance of using marginal costs see Henrichson, Christian and Sarah Galgano (2013) *A Guide to Calculating Justice-System Marginal Costs*. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance. Available online at: <http://cbkb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/A-Guide-to-Calculating-Justice-System-Marginal-Costs-050213.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> The model uses victimization costs from McCollister, Kathryn E., Michael T. French and Hai Fang. "The cost of crime to society: New crime-specific estimates for policy and program evaluation." *Drug and Alcohol Dependence* April 1, 2010 Volume 108, Issues 1-2, Pages 98–109. Available online at: [http://www.drugandalcoholdependence.com/article/S0376-8716\(09\)00422-0/abstract](http://www.drugandalcoholdependence.com/article/S0376-8716(09)00422-0/abstract).

process the case; the marginal costs of pretrial supervision; the marginal costs of jail and prison; and the marginal costs of probation and post-prison supervision. This data can be gathered from local budget data from each of the relevant agencies. To calculate the marginal costs the fixed and administrative costs can be subtracted from each of the agency budgets and then divided by the caseloads to estimate an overall marginal cost for each agency. The costs of crime vary by the severity of the offense, with serious felonies being much more costly than misdemeanors, both to taxpayers and crime victims. In this pretrial cost-benefit model the costs described above are broken out by felony and misdemeanor to account for part of the cost differences in crime severity.

In order to calculate the overall cost of crime, the movement of individuals through the system must also be estimated. A misdemeanant who stays in jail for ten days will be much less costly than a felon who spends years in state prison. The model uses court and other system usage data to capture how individuals move through the criminal justice system. To estimate the overall cost to taxpayers and victims of crime, the likelihood of using each resource is multiplied by the cost of that resource and the length of use of that resource. For resources like prison and parole that are used in future years, a discount rate is used to calculate the present value of all future costs. A weighted average of victimization costs is also calculated using the Uniform Crime Reporting arrest statistics and the victimization costs discussed above. While there are likely victimization costs associated with a misdemeanor, there are not reliable estimates of these costs and for the model they are assumed to be zero. Combining the costs of each part of the system with the likelihood of use and length of use for each part of the criminal justice system, the cost of crime can be estimated for both misdemeanors and felonies.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For jurisdictions that do not have access to criminal justice cost data, a number of national studies, including the McCollister study cited above, have estimated the overall system costs of crime.

The pretrial calculations described above also estimate the change in failures to appear from various pretrial policy and practices. It is necessary to estimate the system costs of failures to appear in order to compare the tradeoff between failures to appear and jail beds. One method to use for estimating these costs is to examine the time spent on an average failure to appear and multiply the time by the wages and benefits of the staff involved. The average number of jail beds used for failures to appear also needs to be calculated and multiplied by the marginal cost of a jail bed. An example of this can be found in Rosenbaum, Hutsell, Tomkins, Bornstein, Herian, and Neeley (2012), *Using Court Date Reminder Postcards to Reduce Courts' Failure to Appear Rates: A Benefit-Cost Analysis*. The estimated costs/savings of failures to appear and new criminal offenses is compared to the overall system costs/savings of different pretrial policies and practices.

#### *The Pretrial Cost-benefit Model*

Once the data described above has been gathered, a jurisdiction can compare its own pretrial policies to proposed local changes, a neighboring jurisdiction, or a national standard to estimate the overall economic impact of those changes. This estimate includes the marginal costs of changes in jail beds, changes in the costs of pretrial supervision, changes in the number of new crimes, changes in failures to appear, changes in long-term recidivism and changes in sentencing outcomes. All of these impacts are measured in the common metric of dollars and cents.

The populated model initially compares “business as usual” in a given pretrial system with a risk-based approach and provides monetized outcomes for the system as it currently exists. Stakeholders in the jurisdiction can then change the “policy levers” in the model to determine what impact a policy change would have on the overall economic benefits. Figure 2, below, shows preliminary results in a county with approximately 5,000 annual pretrial bookings, and demonstrates the economic impact of increasing the number of low risk defendants released quickly and reducing the number of high risk

defendants released. In this example the system costs are reduced, mostly through the use of fewer jail beds, and the costs from new crimes are also reduced from detaining the high risk defendants. This example also includes an estimated impact in the “other” category from increased jail and prison bed days associated with longer sentences when defendants are detained the entire pretrial phase. The costs of failure to appear are much lower than the costs of crime, and while failures to appear are also reduced in this example the impact is too small to appear on the graph.

[Insert Figure 2 here]

### *Limitations of the Model*

The model does have some limitations due to the assumptions made in its development and the availability of data. The model requires a risk-based approach, which currently limits its applicability to a subset of jurisdictions. However, this model follows the approach of others, including WSIPP and Results First, of focusing on evaluated practices that have been proven effective and monetizing their outcomes. As mentioned above, jurisdictions that are not currently using a risk-based approach can still apply the model if they invest in the development of a sample risk profile. However, the model has minimal utility if the jurisdiction is not planning to move from business as usual to a risk-based approach.

The model accounts for the presence of pretrial supervision, but does not include any nuance on the type or intensity of supervision being provided. At the time of development, very little evaluation literature was available in the pretrial field to offer an effect size for pretrial supervision strategies. As this body of literature grows, this model will be updated to account for the nature of supervision and dosage given to defendants at different risk levels.

In the future, the model could also be expanded to include additional variables if needed cost data is collected. The outcome of pretrial misconduct includes only new crimes, rather than violations of supervision, since new crime has more significant cost and public safety implications as well as more data available with which to populate the model. The model also excludes collateral consequences for defendants, such as employment and housing, due to a lack of data to monetize these effects.

Finally, at the time of this publication the model has only been tested in two jurisdictions, which significantly limits its generalizability to other jurisdictions using risk-based decision making and to the pretrial field as a whole. Opportunities for additional testing are currently being explored. Additionally, as other research in the pretrial field becomes more robust, such as the Arnold Foundation's initial findings on criminogenic effect of jail stays, the model can be expanded to incorporate new or replicated findings.

### *Conclusion*

This cost-benefit model for pretrial is a needed tool for an expensive and complex segment of the justice system. Though this first iteration of the model is not able to capture all of the nuances of pretrial decision making, it does provide guidance to systems that wish to understand the effectiveness of current policy and the potential impact of evidence-based policy changes. Initial testing demonstrates the net benefit of a risk-based approach that prioritizes high risk defendants for detention and releases low and moderate risk defendants to the community, and as the body of data grows the model has the potential to inform pretrial policy at the county, state, and national levels.

Cost-benefit analysis cannot stand alone as a basis for decision making, since many elements of the justice system are difficult to quantify, and cost savings is not the only consideration in criminal justice decision making. The rights of the victim, the presumption of liberty for the defendant, and the community's tolerance for risk cannot be accounted for in the model, and it is important not to reduce

costs at the expense of due process in the court system or humane conditions in the jail. However, the cost-benefit analysis for pretrial does offer an objective standard for comparing policy options, and in the context of more subjective considerations can encourage a data-driven approach to pretrial policy.

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## Figures and Tables

Figure 1:





Figure 2:



## Author Biographies

Michael Wilson is an economist who works around the country as a cost-benefit and criminal justice research consultant. In this role he has worked closely with counties to build local capacity by developing cutting-edge criminal justice tools; including cost-benefit models, jail and policy projections tools, and a pretrial specific cost-benefit model. He has taught cost-benefit seminars and webinars through the Vera Institute of Justice, Justice System Partners, the Crime and Justice Institute and the Justice Research and Statistics Association. Michael received his bachelor's, master's, and candidate of philosophy degrees in economics from the University of California at San Diego.

**Justice System Partners (JSP)** makes justice systems more effective, fair and humane to improve the safety and quality of life for system-involved individuals and their communities. As former public sector leaders, JSP team members have seen firsthand the impact of jail population growth. JSP's team members bring decades of experience in public sector management and system reform consulting. With assistance from JSP team members, states have passed evidence-based legislative reforms, counties have promulgated policy to reduce juvenile detention and adult incarceration rates, and agencies have implemented evidence-based reforms to reduce recidivism and increase public safety. Visit us at [www.justicesystempartners.org](http://www.justicesystempartners.org).